

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /094 W  
-----030954 150847Z /11

R 141542Z APR 78  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2745  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0217

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM NATO  
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL 13 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 167TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,  
WHICH WAS HELD ON APRIL 13 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF US  
REP, POLISH REP (STRULAK) DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT.  
IN STANDARD EASTERN TERMS, STRULKA CRITICIZED WESTERN  
FORCE INCREASES, ATTACKED THE WESTERN POSITION ON PARITY  
AND COLLECTIVITY, AND CALLED FOR THE WEST TO ACCEPT THE  
EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MANPOWER FREEZE. THE  
MAIN POINTS OF THE POLISH PRESENTATION, THE FULL TEXT OF  
WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SEEM TO HAVE REACHED A SIGNIFICANT  
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STAGE BOTH BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF DISCUSSIONS  
OF GENERAL ISSUES AND BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT STATUS  
OF THE DISCUSSION OF NUMERICAL DATA.

2. NATO DECISIONS WHICH STIMULATE THE ARMS RACE BY  
CALLING FOR THE INCREASE OF NATO'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

ARE A PARTICULAR SOURCE OF CONCERN.

3. DESPITE THE WESTERN CONTENTION THAT PROTESTS AGAINST WESTERN MOVES PROMOTING THE ARMS RACE WILL DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE REAL ISSUES IN THESE TALKS, EASTERN REPS ARE BOUND TO WARN AGAINST THE ARMS RACE AND CALL FOR ITS CESSATION.

4. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS STAND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A MUTUAL REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WHILE PRESERVING THE EXISTING APPROXIMATE PARITY OF FORCES, AND NOTE THAT THE WEST HAS ALSO DECLARED ITS READINESS TO SEEK PROGRESS IN THESE TALKSM

5. HOWEVER, THESE WESTERN EXPRESSIONS MUST BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF INCREASING WESTERN ENDEAVORS TO ACHIEVE A FINAL OUTCOME OF UNEQUAL, ASYMMETRICAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE TO EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AS IT WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE LEGAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR THEM.

6. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SEEK AN EQUITABLE AND REALISTIC OUTCOME WHICH WOULD PLACE OBLIGATIONS OF COMPARABLE WEIGHT UPON ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

7. THE WESTERN POSITION IS BASED UPON THE WRONG ASSUMPTIONS.  
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8. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS STATE THAT AN OUTCOME MUST COMPLY WITH THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR "PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY".

9. PARITY IS FULLY CONSONANT WITH EASTERN PROPOSALS SINCE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD PRESERVE THE EXISTING APPROXIMATELY EQUAL FORCE RELATIONSHIP AT LOWER LEVELS, WHILE THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD UNDERMINE PARITY THROUGH ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

10. THE WEST MUST SUBSTANTIALLY MODIFY ITS POSITION IF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME OF REAL PARITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED.

11. ALTHOUGH THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVE THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, THEY HAVE AGREED THAT THE US AND USSR CAN REDUCE SEPARATELY IN A FIRST PHASE ON THE CONDITION THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT UNDERTAKES GUARANTEES IN THAT PHASE REGARDING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS.

12. ALTHOUGH SUCH A REQUIREMENT IS LOGICAL AND VALID,

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USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BELGIUM  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0217

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA HAVE STILL  
NOT RESPONDED ADEQUATELY TO IT AFTER MORE THAN TWO  
YEARS.

13. AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED PREVIOUSLY, THE WESTERN  
CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO  
THE EAST, IN PART SINCE SUCH CEILING WOULD WEAKEN THE  
EFFECT OF REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS  
AND CANADA.

14. UNDER COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, THE STRONGEST COMPONENTS  
OF NATO COMBAT CAPABILITY COULD BECOME EVEN STRONGER  
THAN IS PRESENTLY THE CASE.

15. SUCH A SHIFT IN THE FORCE RELATIONSHIP WOULD HAVE  
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SERIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY RECERCUSSIONS FOR THE EAST AND WOULD BE REGARDED AS UPSETTING THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE AREA TO THE DETRIMENT OF EASTERN SECURITY.

16. BY CONTRAST, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION COMMITMENTS IS EQUITABLE, PRACTICAL AND WOULD BEST SERVE DETENTE.

17. WESTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA DO NOT INTEND TO REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS ARE A SOURCE OF CONCERN TO THE EAST SINCE SUCH REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND STAGE ARE INDISPENSIBLE.

18. WITHOUT SUCH REDUCTIONS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, THE REDUCTION PROCESS CAN HARDLY ENSURE THE PRESERVATION OF STABILITY AND THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY.

19. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CALL UPON THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE TASKS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

20. IT IS TIME TO TAKE DECISIONS TOWARD REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD SECURE A BALANCE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL PARTIES, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY SERVING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

21. CONTRARY TO WESTERN CRITICISMS, ADOPTION OF THE EASTERN NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT CONTRACTUALIZE THE SUPERIORITY OF ANY SIDE, BUT WOULD ADD TO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND BE INDICATIVE OF A BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. RESOR

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